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Abstract—We consider a general small-scale market for agent-
to-agent resource sharing, in which each agent could either be
a server (seller) or a client (buyer) in each time period. In
every time period, a server has a certain amount of resources
that any client could consume, and randomly gets matched with
a client. Our target is to maximize the resource utilization in
such an agent-to-agent market, where the agents are strategic.
During each transaction, the server gets money and the client
gets resources. Hence, trade ratio maximization implies efficiency
maximization of our system. We model the proposed market
system through a Mean Field Game approach and prove the
existence of the Mean Field Equilibrium, which can achieve an
almost 100% trade ratio. Finally, we carry out a simulation study
motivated by an agent-to-agent computing market, and a case
study on a proposed photovoltaic market, and show the designed
market benefits both individuals and the system as a whole.
I. INTRODUCTION
The sharing economy is a paradigm shift in the working
of the twenty-first century marketplace. Supported by the ease
of communication and availability of information provided by
the Internet, this marketplace innovation has blurred the line
between producers and consumers, turning participants into
prosumers who can both provide and utilize resources and
services. Successful platforms in this space enable access to
resources that are commonplace, but are needed at the right
place at the right time. Typically, these resources have the
property that “unused value is wasted value,” in that idle time
cannot be utilized later on. Examples include P2P networks
such as BitTorrent (bartering of bandwidth), Fon (token-based
WiFi sharing), Uber/Lyft (typically, fixed-price car sharing),
and Airbnb (marketplace-mediated home sharing).
Prosumers typically provide or consume small amounts of
resources, which means that bilateral trade (one-to-one) is the
norm. Thus, the sharing platform enables bilateral trading,
with options ranging from barter to bargaining with monetary
instruments. Prosumers are ephemeral in that they might
participate for some duration of time, and then switch to some
other platfrom or stop altogether. The number of participants
at any time is large, which is how sharing systems manage
to match demand and supply. Also, in most existing sharing
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systems, prosumers act largely as consumers or producers, but
rarely switch roles.
A novel set of applications are now emerging in which
prosumers switch roles from being producers to consumers
frequently. Here, agents have either demand or resources
that are bursty, which results in recurring role changes. Like
P2P networks used for content sharing, these applications
are associated with easily sharable resources, and provide
services that are indistinguishable from traditional sources.
We consider agent-to-agent (A2A) market design with two
such applications in mind, namely, (i) sharing computational
resources and (ii) sharing electricity resources, with details as
follows:
(a) Distributed Computation: We consider enterprise level
systems, such as compute clusters at universities and other data
analytics organizations. Many run with bursty utilization (our
data indicates that several clusters at the authors’ organization
are utilized at about 50-60% on average), with users often
needing more or less resources than available at a single
cluster. Virtualization for sharing is straightforward, and the
altenative is to pay a fee for commercial cloud computing
services from an organization such as Amazon EC2.
(b) Distributed Electricity Generation: We consider rooftop-
photovoltaics (PV) based electricity generation at the level
of homes and small businesses, where generation depends on
the intensity of sunshine. As we will see, geographic vagaries
mean that one can shift from being a producer to consumer
often, and the existing grid can allow incorporation of these
resources. Again, a traditional alternative exists in the form of
electricity purchase from a utility provider.
While there are existing platforms using a two-sided market
approach for some applications, approaches that focus on pro-
sumers that frequently change roles from provider to consumer
are few. Consider a bilateral market in which currency is used
as the instrument of trading. A simple mechanism is one which
a consumer (that we term as a client) is matched to a random
producer (that we term as a server), each places a bid, and
a trade happens if the client bids higher than the server’s
demand. The server then receives the currency equal to her bid,
and must incur a cost of providing service. Thus, an agent in a
client role pays the agent in a server role to obtain resources.
Likewise, the agent that is currently a server can use these
currency units to obtain resources when it in turn becomes
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a client. Also, each time an agent in a client role obtains
resources, it generates surplus, measured in currency units.
This corresponds, for example, to the productivity gains due
to obtaining compute cycles or electricity. If the client does
not succeed in obtaining service under the sharing economy, it
faces an cost, which can be thought of as the negative feeling
of having to search for an alternative source or to experience
delays. Would such a market be sustainable, i.e., would there
be enough resource trades generating currency (surplus) such
that available resource utilization is high?
In this paper, we develop a game theoretic framework
to model and analyze A2A markets under the mechanism
described above. The choice of mechanism in a successful
marketplace often depends on the timescale of resource usage,
with simple solutions such as bartering being effective at
fast timescales, and more complex ones like bargaining at
long timescales. The timescale of our candidate applications
(minutes to hours) suggest that a low complexity solution is
desirable, and the value of the mechanism will be apparent
in later sections. In the context of our applications, random
matching of agents is viable since cloud computing is essen-
tially agnostic to geography, while integration of renewable
energy into the electricity grid is already well established in
the US (eg. using net-metering in which customers can sell
back excess renewable energy generated [1]).
Our market model consists of random matching between
a large number of ephemeral agents that might leave at any
time. We assume that a departing agent is replaced with a
new agent, keeping the total number of agents fixed. The state
of any agent is the amount of currency that it possesses at
that time. A client can be constrained to only place a bid
if it has sufficient currency to do so. It is clear that such a
budget constraint might restrict entering agents from obtaining
resources, and result in low trade volume. Indeed, some P2P
networks such as BitTorrent build in a measure of altruism to
reduce friction in the system. In our context, we also consider
models in which the client can obtain a loan from a central
entity (a bank loan) or from the server itself (a peer loan).
The client must pay back the loan with interest after the trade
using the currency (surplus) generated by receiving resources.
A. Mean Field Games
We investigate the existence of an equilibrium using the
framework of Mean Field Games (MFG) [2]. Here, each agent
assumes that the matched agent would play an action drawn
independently from a fixed distribution over its bid space. The
agent then chooses an action that is the best response against
actions drawn in this manner. The system is said to be at
Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) if this best response action
is itself a sample drawn from the assumed bid distribution.
The framework considerably reduces computational overhead,
and can easily be shown to be an accurate approximation
when the number of agents is asymptotically large in arnge
of applications [3]–[5] including our context.
The MFG framework offers a relatively simple way of
modeling and analyzing large scale games when each subset
of agents interacts infrequently. In the context of the sharing
economy, a particular producer and consumer would rarely
be matched together multiple times in their lifetimes, since
the number of participants is large and participant lifetime is
limited. This implies that little utility is lost due to minimal
history retention, and action choice becomes less complex.
The main related papers in the MFG setting are [3], [4].
In [3], a sytem for auctioning advertisements on a webpage is
considered. Here agents are advertisers that bid for these spots,
and the main result shows how convergence to the MFE takes
place while learning about the value of winning a slot on the
webpage. The model is extended in [4] to include hard budget
constraints in the sense that agents may only bid an amount
less than their existing budget. The budget itself is updated
according to an independent arrival process, and the result
is a characterization of the reduced bid that would be made
in this case. Neither of these considers matching markets of
producers and consumers that are interchangeable.
B. Other Related Work
There has recently been much work in the context of
the sharing economy, but little in the way of understanding
systems in which agents change their roles often. Most work
that deals with this problem considers the special case of
data/spectrum sharing in wireless networks. For instance, [6]
study pricing models for a system like Fon in which WiFi is
shared. In the same manner, [7], [8] study spectrum sharing
and mobile data offload in which peers can use each other’s
resources in the setting of a small number of agents. They
consider mechanisms across a small number of agents such as
contracts and double auctions. However, they do not consider
repeated play with learning of behaviors.
In the context of electricity resources, [9] consider sharing
of storage resources in a smartgrid setting, with charging when
prices are low and sharing when proces are high. Unlike
their setting, we do not assume any storage, and usage by
a customer can only happen with successful trade.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work
that considers mechanism design for bilateral (A2A) repeated
games with role switching agents between producer (server)
and consumer (client) in the mean field setting.
C. Main Results
Our main result is a characterization of the mean field
equilibrium bid distribution under three systems, namely (i)
a hard budget constraint, (ii) a bank loan, and (iii) a peer
loan. We show the existence of a mean field equilibrium in
each case, and show that there exists a set of equilibria that are
simple, and characterized by the server setting a fixed price k,
while the client chooses whether or not to bid k based on her
budget and estimate of future value. In particular, the client
decision turns out to be a set of divisions of the budget into
intervals, with k being optimal in some and 0 being optimal
in others. In all cases, if the budget is sufficiently large, the
client always bids k, while if it is sufficiently small, it always
bids 0.
The stable bid k is not unique, and a set of such bids exist
(with the minimum being lower bounded by server cost, and
the maximum being upper bounded by the client surplus plus
cost of not obtaining service), each one of which is a MFE.
However, the fraction of time that a trade happens (i.e, the
client actually bids k) is not the same for all systems and
values of k. In particular, the bank loan and peer loan models
both attain higher trade ratios, particularly in the case when the
initial budget of an agent is low. Essentially, a small boost in
the form of a loan (which is retuned immediately with interest
via the surplus generated by the trade) is successful in reducing
friction in the market allowing it to attain high efficiency.
The trade ratio also depends on the value of k itself.
Interestingly, maximum trade is not necessarily attained at the
lowest possible value of k, but there exists a value between
the highest and lowest at which this happens. The reason is
that since clients and servers are interchangeable, extraction of
surplus by a server is not always a bad thing from the client’s
perspective, since it too will gain when it in turn becomes a
server. When the initial budget is low, a client is forced to take
a loan in order to bid a high value of k. But when it does so,
it transfers a larger sum to the server, which then (subtracting
service cost), might be in a position to obtain service without
having to take a loan in the future (when it’s a client). Thus,
aggregation of surplus at servers may not be bad.
We conduct numerical studies to illustrate the viability of
our scheme. We first run simulations modeling a A2A cloud
computing application, in which agents alternate probabilisti-
cally between a client and a server. Insights on trade ratios and
optimal prices are observed in this setting. We then conduct a
case study on the PV electricity generating and trading market.
Here, we use weather, price and demand data of two cities,
Austin and El Paso, Texas USA, to show how the system might
perform in a realistic setting, and estimate the gains that could
be obtained on a per agent (household or small business) basis
amount to several hundred dollars a year.
II. MEAN FIELD MODEL
We consider a general model of the proposed market with a
large number of agents. Each agent maintains a private budget
state and can bid any value within her budget in the role
of a client. When a client gets matched to a server, each
places a bid. If the server indicates a lower price than what
the client proposes, a bilateral trade happens. At the end of
a successful trade, the client pays the server’s asking price,
receives service and translates it into a dollar value surplus that
directly increases her budget. Meanwhile, the server receives
the payment, and pays the cost of the providing service. Thus,
the client will bid strategically under some belief about the
likely bids of the server, and vice versa.
Computing the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of such a
system is complex, particularly when the number of agents
is large. Instead, we use a mean field approximation of the
proposed market system, which has proven to be an accurate
representation when the number of agents is asymptotically
1 
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Fig. 1. Mean Field Game
large [3], [10]. Fig. 1 illustrates our mean field model from
the perspective of a single agent.
At each discrete time step, an agent could either be a client
or a server with fixed probabilities, pc and ps, respectively.
A client places a bid based on her belief of server’s bid
distribution, and vice versa. Since the number of the agents
is large, which implies that both the number of clients and
servers at any instant are large as well, each individual can
assume that her opponent’s bid is drawn independently from
the c.d.f. ρc or ρs, respectively. Then the complexity of the
single agent decision making problem is much reduced. In the
rest of this section, we will provide a term-wise description
of our mean field model with the accompanying notation.
Time: Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, ...}
Agent: At each time period t, an agent could either be a
client or a server, with probability pc or ps, respectively. Note
that the total number of agents is large and pc + ps = 1.
Bids: When a client is matched with a server, each places
a bid, denoted as xc and xs, for the client and server,
respectively. When xc ≥ xs, the trade succeeds and the client
pays xs to the server.
State: Each agent keeps track of her budget, b, as a private
state. At time t, the budget of a agent is updated as following
if a trade happens, i.e. xc ≥ xs,
b[t+1] =
{
b[t] + s− xs − α(xs − b[t])+, as a client w.p. pc
b[t]− cserve + xs, as a server w.p. ps
(1)
if a trade fails, i.e. xc < xs, b[t+ 1] = b[t]
Note that s represents the fixed dollar value surplus that a
client gains from receiving service, and cserve is the corre-
sponding fixed cost that a server pays for providing service.
Parameter α is the penalty term when a client overdraws on
her budget. One should think of this as taking a loan from a
bank (which is our focus case; a peer loan is also possible),
which is then paid back in full with interest after service is
obtained and surplus is generated. Hence, α is typically greater
than 1. The support of the budget is R+ := [0,+∞).
Costs: We have already mentioned cserve, which is the
server’s cost of providing service. In addition, we introduce
another cost, close, which denotes the cost of failure to obtain
service as a client. This models an instantaneous dissatisfaction
suffered by the client, but does not impact her budget.
Regeneration: An agent may quit the system at the begin-
ning of any time period t with probability 1 − β, and may
stay with probability β ∈ (0, 1). We assume that a new agent
enters the system when an old agent leaves, and the budget of
the new agent is drawn from a probability distribution Ψ with
a density on Binit that is a bounded subset of R+.
Best Response Policy: As an agent participates in the
system, she places bids at each time period. Hence, she needs
to solve a repeated decision making problem, given the private
budget b and the public belief about the bid distribution
ρ = [ρc, ρs]. The probability of the trade happening can be
computed for a given bid using the public belief about her
opponent’s bid distribution. This probability characterizes the
next step transition of an agent’s budget. Hence, a dynamic
program is defined for an agent to find her best response policy,
θρ, as is shown in green/dark blocks of Fig. 1. We will discuss
this in detail in section III.
Stationary Distribution of Budget: Given the best re-
sponse policy, the state transition of an agent is described
by equation (1) together with the regeneration, which forms
the transition kernel of a discrete-time Markov Chain. The
stationary distribution of this Markov Chain, piρ, is equivalent
to the resulting budget distribution after a one-step transition
over infinite number of agents with the public belief ρ.
Mean Field Equilibrium: Given the assumed bid distri-
bution ρ, solving the dynamic program, the best response
policy is obtained, which defines the kernel of the budget
Markov Chain. Thereafter, taking the stationary distribution
of budget together with the best response of each state, a new
bid distribution γ(ρ) can be calculated. If γ(ρ) turns out to
be the same as the public belief ρ, the system is at an MFE.
Detailed discussions of MFE can be found in Section IV.
III. BEST RESPONSE POLICY
To characterize the best response policy of an agent in
different roles, we need to formulate the dynamic program
mentioned in the previous section. Before that, we first in-
troduce a few easily established facts regarding equilibrium
behavior of the agents, which will shrink the space of dynamic
programs of interests. Here, we consider the agents bid discrete
values in R+. Later, we will show a specific class of equilibria
exists and achieves high efficiency, in which all servers bid one
and the same price. We further define random variables X˜s and
X˜c distributed according to ρs and ρc, and the corresponding
p.m.f. are pX˜s and pX˜c . Suppose the bid spaces of clients and
servers are upper bounded by x¯c and x¯s, we have following:
Fact 1: Given ρs, a client should never bid higher than x¯s,
where x¯s is the upper-end of the support of ρs, i.e., ρs(xs) =
1 ∀xs ≥ x¯s and ρs(xs) < 1 ∀xs < x¯s.
Fact 2: Given ρc, a server should never bid higher than x¯c,
where x¯c is the upper-end of the support of ρc, i.e., ρc(xc) =
1 ∀xc ≥ x¯c and ρc(xc) < 1 ∀xc < x¯c.
Fact 3: Given pX˜s , a client should never bid xc for xc > 0
such that pX˜s(xc) = 0.
Fact 4: Given pX˜c , a server should never bid xs such that
pX˜c(xs) = 0.
These facts hold since the violation each of them yields
a non-positive expected payoff to a generic agent. Thus, we
claim that if an equilibrium exists, which we will discuss in
section IV, then in each equilibrium, by Fact 1 and 2, we have
x¯s = x¯c, meanwhile, by Fact 3 and 4, we have the action space
of an agent in each role has the same discrete support, denoted
as D ⊂ R+, with the corresponding beliefs.
A. Value Function
As we discussed in section II, the repeated decision making
problem for a single agent (with a geometrically distributed
lifetime) forms a discounted cost dynamic program. Unlike a
traditional market, the agent plays two roles (client or server)
probabilistically over its lifetime. In each role, the agent
encounters a different decision making problem, but based on
its private budget that is common to both roles. We track a
generic agent just before her role (client or server) is revealed,
and we will use this sampling point in the rest of the document.
However, as an agent takes an action (bids) only after her role
is revealed, this is consistent with our set-up mentioned in
Section II. Hence, we define the Bellman equation associated
with the dynamic program of interest as follows:
vρ(b) = psvs(b) + pcvc(b)
= ps
(
max
xs∈D
Eρ[1x˜c≥xs(βvρ(b+ xs − cserve)
+ xs − cserve) + 1x˜c<xsβvρ(b)]
)
+ pc
(
max
xc∈D∩[0,b+s/(1+α)]
Eρ[1xc≥x˜s(βvρ(b+ s− x˜s
− α(x˜s − b)+) + s− x˜s) + 1xc<x˜s(βvρ(b)− close)]
)
, (2)
where x˜s and x˜c are realizations of random variables, X˜s and
X˜c, and vρ(·) is the value function of a generic agent, which
is in turn composed of an average of vs(·) and vc(·) (value
functions once her role is revealed). Since each agent’s role
is determined exogenously at the beginning of a time period,
the evolution of both vs(·) and vc(·) depends on vρ(·) so that
(2) remains consistent. We believe that the exogenously driven
role choice makes this a natural assumption. Since the role of
the agent in our context is usually determined by the external
environment, the value of currency should be determined by
the underlying market and not the role one’s currently playing.
In our model, the client is allowed to overdraw her budget
with an upper limit such that the budget does not end up
negative after any possible transaction, i.e. the client is allowed
to choose up to the maximum value of xc subject to (b+ s−
xc − α(xc − b)+) being non-negative. A simple calculation
then yields the upper limit of a client’s bid as b+ s/(1 + α).
Also, for both clients and servers, when a trade happens, a
budget update as well as an instantaneous gain in value is
induced, which captures the fact that the trade generates value
both in the present and in the future. Further, notice that the
expectation of the indicator functions in equation (2) can be
determined using the probability of trade happening, which in
turn can be calculated directly using ρ. Then we can further
characterize vρ(b) as follows:
vρ(b) =
= ps
(
βvρ(b) + max
xs∈D
(1− ρc(xs))(β(vρ(b+ xs − cserve)
− vρ(b)) + xs − cserve)
)
+ pc
(
max
xc∈D∩[0,b+s/(1+α)]
[
xc∑
x˜s=0
pX˜s(x˜s)
(
βvρ(b+ s− x˜s − α(x˜s − b)+) + s− x˜s
)
+ (1− ρs(xc))(βvρ(b)− close)
])
= βvρ(b) + max
(xs,xc)∈A(b)
([
ps(1− ρc(xs))(xs − cserve)
+ pc
(
ρs(xc)(s− E[X˜s|X˜s ≤ xc])− (1− ρs(xc))close
)]
+ β
[
ps(1− ρc(xs))∆vs(b, xs, cserve)
+ pc
xc∑
x˜s=0
pX˜s(x˜s)∆vc(b, s, x˜s, α)
])
, (3)
where
A(b) is the two dimensional bid space D×D∩[0, b+s/(1+α)],
∆vs(b, xs, cserve) = vρ(b+ xs − cserve)− vρ(b), and
∆vc(b, s, x˜s, α) = vρ(b+ s− x˜s−α(x˜s− b)+)− vρ(b). Note
that the latter two functions account for the change in value
with a trade for a server and a client, respectively. Then, the
space of possible value functions is
V = {f : (R+ → R) : ‖f‖∞ <∞} = L∞.
Define the Bellman operator Tρ on L∞ as below:
(Tρf)(b) = βf(b) + max
(xs,xc)∈A(b)
((
ps(1− ρc(xs))(xs
− cserve) + pc
(
ρs(xc)(s− E[X˜s|X˜s ≤ xc])− (1
− ρs(xc))close
))
+ β
[
ps(1− ρc(xs))∆fs(b, xs, cserve)
+ pc
xc∑
x˜s=0
pX˜s(x˜s)∆fc(b, s, x˜s, α)
])
(4)
where ∆fs(b, xs, cserve) = f(b + xs − cserve) − f(b), and
∆fc(b, s, x˜s, α) = f(b+ s− x˜s − α(x˜s − b)+)− f(b).
B. Properties of the Value Function
In order to characterize the best response policy, we need to
derive some useful properties of the value function vρ. We start
by proving the convergence of value iteration of the Bellman
operator Tρ(·). This follows immediately from classical results
by in [11], as long as we can prove the following three lemmas.
Define the transition kernel Q(B|b, (xs, xc)) for non-empty
Borel subset B ⊂ R+ by equation (1) together with the
regeneration. Note that given xs, xc, the probability of trade
happening can be directly calculated through ρ.
Lemma 1: For every state b ∈ R+,
1) There exists an effective bid space Aˆ(b), which is compact;
2) The reward-per-stage is lower semi-continuous in (xs, xc);
3) The function µ(b, xs, xc) := EQ[u(B)|b, (xs, xc)] is con-
tinuous in (xs, xc) ∈ Aˆ(b) for every function u ∈ V .
Proof: The proof of 1) follows from showing the ex-
istence of upper bounds on bids for both client and server
yielding Aˆ(b). The reward-per-stage in (4) is defined as
c(b, (xs, xc)) , ps(1− ρc(xs))(xs − cserve) + pc
(
ρs(xc)(s−
E[X˜s|X˜s ≤ xc])− (1− ρs(xc))close
)
and given b, xs, xc, the
kernel Q is fully determined by ps, pc, ρ,Ψ. The continuity
of Q over the discrete topology of Aˆ(b) is natural. Details of
this proof are available in Appendix A.
Lemma 2: There exist constants ξ ≥ 0 and η ≥ 0 with
1 ≤ η < 1/β, and a function w ≥ 1 s.t. for every state b
1) supA(b) |c(b, (xs, xc))| ≤ ξw(b); and
2) supA(b) EQ[w(B)|b, (xs, xc)] ≤ ηw(b).
Lemma 3: For every state (b), the function ω(b, xs, xc) :=
EQ[w(B)|b, (xs, xc)] is continuous in (xs, xc) ∈ Aˆ(x).
Proof: Since cserve, s and close are fixed, c(b, (xs, xc)) is
bounded. Then taking a bounded function w, with the conti-
nuity of Q, the results in Lemma 2 and 3 are straightforward.
Theorem 1: (Hernandez-Lerma [11]) Given the belief ρs, ρc
and the corresponding p.m.f. pX˜s , pX˜c we have,
1) There exists a j ∈ N such that T jρ : V → V is a contraction
mapping. Hence, there exists a unique f∗ρ ∈ V such that
Tρf
∗
ρ = f
∗
ρ , and for any f ∈ V , Tnρ f → f∗ρ as n→∞.
2) The fixed point f∗ρ of operator Tρ is the unique solution to
the Bellman equation, i.e., f∗ρ = v
∗
ρ .
Lemma 4: v∗ρ(b) is monotonically increasing in b.
Proof: By Theorem 1, we have proved vρ converges to a
unique fixed point v∗ρ over Tρ. Thus, it is sufficient to prove
that Tρ maintains the assumed monotonicity. Full details of
the proof are presented in Appendix A.
C. Best Response Policy Characterization
As discussed in Section II, our goal is to maximize server
utilization from the system perspective, which is equivalent to
maximize the expected trade ratio in the market. Furthermore,
the budget, which is defined through equation (2), increases
through successful trade. These observations imply that we
should characterize the best response policy not only from
the single agent perspective, but also from the perspective of
maximizing the expected trade ratio. We will use this goal to
motivate a specific family of equilibria for our problem. Given
the four facts we discussed at the beginning of this section,
we then show that for the best system performance a certain
simpler class of bidding functions suffice.
Lemma 5: All servers bidding the same price within the
clients’ affordable range maximizes the expected trade ratio.
Proof: The proof follows from by comparing the trade ra-
tios between the scenarios in which the server places multiple
bids or a single bid. Using the four facts, the corresponding
client bid distributions can be further characterized. Full details
are available in Appendix A.
Motivated by Lemma 5, we characterize the best response
policy by initializing the belief of server’s bid distribution to be
pX˜s(k) = 1 for some fixed k, i.e. all servers bid the same price
k. For non-trivial behavior k ≥ cserve, but k can be higher
than s, though not by much, i.e. s− k ≥ close, otherwise, the
trade will become worthless; see section V for the latter.
1) Client’s Best Response: Given the belief that all servers
bid k, the value function of clients from (2) becomes
vc(b) = max
xc∈D∩[0,b+s/(1+α)]
(
1xc≥k(β(vρ(b+ s− k
− α(k − b)+)) + s− k) + 1xc<k(βvρ(b)− close)
)
By Facts 1 and 3, we conclude that the client will bid either
0 or k. If a client bids k, the trade will happen w.p. 1, and
will fail otherwise. We define the following useful terms:
vc win(b) = β(v
∗
ρ(b+ s− k − α(k − b)+)) + s− k,
vc lose(b) = βv
∗
ρ(b)− close, bc win = b+ s− k − α(k − b)+,
and bc lose = b.
Since the budget can never go negative, we have an upper
limit on a client’s bid of b + s/(1 + α). If k lies out of
this range, the client will simply bid 0. Now, from Lemma
4, bc win ≥ bc lose i.e. b ≥ ((1 + α)k − s)/α = k − s−kα
implies that if vc win(b) ≥ vc lose(b), then the client should
bid k. Thus, we have a lower bound on the bid as 0, and the
upper bound as k. The exact bidding strategy depends on the
relationship between vc win(b) and vc lose(b). A summary of
the best responses of a client with budget b is:
x∗c =

0 b ∈ [0, k − s1+α )
0 if vc win(b) ≤ vc lose(b) b ∈ [k − s1+α , k − s−kα ]
k if vc win(b) ≥ vc lose(b) b ∈ [k − s1+α , k − s−kα ]
k b ∈ ( (1+α)k−sα ,∞)
(5)
Note that when k < s/(1 +α), all clients will bid k, which
is an extreme case of a “cheap resource.” It implies the price
one needs to pay is too low, as compared to the gain from
the trade. We further characterize the best response function
θc,ρ(b) in the following Lemma.
Lemma 6: θc,ρ(b) is piecewise constant on [0, k− s−kα ] with
a finite number of constant intervals.
Proof: The proof follows by showing the difference
vc win(b)−vc lose(b) is of bounded total variation. Full details
are available in Appendix A.
2) Server’s Best Response: Given the client’s best response
function, we observe that under certain circumstances, the
client will bid either 0 or k based on her private state. By Facts
2 and 4, we conclude that the server will again bid either 0
or k. We can refine the server’s belief about the client’s bid
distribution as pX˜c = (z, 1− z), where z = P(X˜c = 0). Then
vs(b) = (1−z)(βvρ(b+xs−cserve)+xs−cserve)+zβvρ(b).
By Lemma 4, for ∀b ∈ R+, we have vs(b) is monotonically
increasing in xs, when xs ≤ k. Hence, all servers will bid k.
Given a feasible k (which we refer to as a “unified price” for
both clients and servers), the discussion above lends credence
to the existence of an equilibrium over the simple set of beliefs
given by z. We will prove that such Mean Field Equilibrium
(MFE) indeed exists in section IV.
IV. MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIUM
The main result of this section is to show the existence of an
MFE with under simple bidding strategies. Given the unified
price k and the probability of bidding 0 as a client, z, the
kernel of state transitions in (2) is well defined. Denote the
fixed point value function as v∗z . Taking the best response of
client using (5), we have the following budget transitions for
a generic agent before she reveals her role:
b[t+ 1] =

b[t] w.p. β(psz + pc1b[t]∈B0)
b[t] + s− k − α(k − b[t])+ w.p. βpc1b[t]∈R+\B0
b[t] + k − cserve w.p. βps(1− z)
Binit w.p. (1− β)Ψ(Binit)
(6)
where, B0 ⊂ R+, in which the agents bid 0 as a client,
and Ψ is the probability measure of the agent regeneration
process. Set Binit ⊆ R+ is the set of possible budgets with
regeneration. When b[t] lies on the boundaries of B0, by
Lemma 6, a client is indifferent to bidding 0 or k. Also, the
number of these boundary points in B0 is finite, which leads
to a Borel-null set in B0. Hence, w.l.o.g. adding these points
by assuming the client will bid 0 with some probability ptie
and k with the complementary probability will not alter the
proofs in the rest of this section.
Observe that from (6), given the current state b[t], the next
state b[t + 1] is independent of the rest of the history. Thus,
the transition kernel above defines a Markov process for the
budget, and we have following Lemma.
Lemma 7: The Markov chain {b[t]}∞t=0 with transition
kernel (6) is positive recurrent and has a unique stationary
distribution, piz . Furthermore, given z, piz is absolutely con-
tinuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on R+.
Proof: The proof of the first statement follows by showing
that the one-step transition function satisfies the Doeblin
condition, then using the results in [12, Chap. 12]. Then we
derive the relationship between piz(B) and pi
(τ)
z (B|b), where
τ is the first regeneration time after t = 0 and b(0) = b to
prove the second statement. Details in Appendix B.
Combining the best response of each state θz and piz, a
new value z˜ can be calculated. If z˜ = z, then we say the
system is at an MFE. The main result of this section is to
prove the following theorem, where θc,z(·) is the set-valued
(subset of {0, k}) function of client bids as a function of its
budget. More formally. θc,z : R+ → {0, k} is the client’s best
response function which maps the budget to a binary choice
of bids, either 0 or k. As mentioned earlier piz : R+ → [0, 1],
defines the stationary distribution of the budget, which maps
the state space to a probability measure.
Theorem 2: Define γ(z) , piz(θ−1c,z (0)),∀z ∈ [0, 1], where
θ−1c,z (0) is the lower inverse of θc,z(·) at 0. There exists an
MFE (z, k, θz), such that z = γ(z).
Define function γ that maps the assumed belief z to the
resultant z˜ = γ(z) through the best-response dynamics. To
prove Theorem 2, we need to show that γ(·) has a fixed
point, i.e., γ(z) = z for some z ∈ [0, 1]. Given the closed
interval [0, 1] is compact and convex, by Brouwer Fixed Point
Theorem, it is sufficient to show γ is continuous. However,
the best response function θc,z(·) is a set-valued function with
a range containing all non-empty subsets of {0, k} given the
characterization in Section III. We first show θc,z(·) is upper
hemicontinuous in z, then discuss the continuity of piz . Finally,
we prove the single point inverse (lower inverse) of the upper
hemicontinuous set-valued function θc,z(·) is a subset that
consists of finite number of continuous pieces, which leads
to the continuity of γ using the absolute continuity of piz with
respect to Lebesgue measure from Lemma 7. The results with
an outline of the proof are given below.
Lemma 8: v∗z is Lipschitz continuous in z.
Proof: The proof follows using the properties of the con-
traction mapping T jz in Theorem 1. Full details are presented
in Appendix B.
Theorem 3: θc,z(·) is upper hemicontinuous in z.
Proof: Given z and k, we can rewrite v∗z in a different
way such that it can be represented as a increasing piecewise
linear convex function. The proof holds by applying Berge’s
Maximum Theorem. For full details see Appendix B.
Theorem 4: piz is continuous in z.
Proof: The key idea of the proof is using Portmanteau
Theorem to show for any uniform converging sequence zn →
z and any open set B, lim infn→∞ pizn(B) ≥ piz(B). Details
of this proof are presented in Appendix B.
Theorem 5: γ(z) , piz(θ−1c,z (0)) is continuous in z.
Proof: We prove this by showing that θ−1c,z (0) is a conti-
nuity set for piz . See Appendix B for details.
V. SIMULATION
A. Statistics of a Computing Cluster
As mentioned in Section I, one of our candidate applications
is sharing computational resources. We consider the statistics
of three computing clusters at the authors’ institution over two
weeks: the hourly mean utilizations 68.5%, 54.8%, 45.4% and
median utilizations 70%, 55% and 47.5%. We observe that the
mean is similar to the median in all three cases, which implies
half of the time a cluster has a high load, and in the other
half, it has available capacity. While it is difficult to obtain
precise values of the other parameters for our model for this
application, we can use it to compare equilibria for different
parameter settings. We will conduct a more realistic case study
on energy trading in the next section.
B. Monte Carlo Simulations
We conduct Monte Carlo simulations of three versions of
our system over one million virtual agents (cluster owners).
The three models are designed as following:
Hard Model: Overdraft as a client is not allowed. The budget
b is a hard constraint of the client’s bidding space.
Bank Model: Here, the client can overdraw the budget to a
certain extent such that a non-negative post-trade budget is
guaranteed. The amount overdrawn comes from an external
source, i.e., a bank, and the client has to pay both the principal
and interest back.
Loan Model: The server takes on the role of the bank. It
implies the server and the client agree to mining the surplus
s together through the trade. The server obtains additional
revenue beyond the payment k in doing so. In this case, the
server’s expected payoff is higher than the bank model.
We believe that similar proofs of the existence and nature of
equilibrium apply to all three cases above and not just the bank
model. Before presenting simulation results, we first introduce
the parameter settings. We use a regeneration factor β = 0.98;
we assume that agents have an equal probability being clients
and servers, i.e., ps = pc = 0.5; α = 1.1, which means that
the interest rate is set to be 10%; s = 8 and cserve = 6
make the trade generate reasonable amount of value; close =
0.5 captures the client disappointment when the trade fails;
Ψ(Binit) = U [0, 5], new agents come with limited amount of
budget, which helps us better analyze the differences among
three models; and price k = 7 in order to balance the benefits
between servers and clients through the trade. Later in this
section, we will show how different prices and initial budgets
affect the equilibrium trade ratio in the bank model.
Fig. 2 shows the convergence of the MFE belief, z. In
the hard constraint model, clients cannot afford the price
k = 7, so all clients bid 0 and the system freezes. However,
in the bank model and loan model, the system gradually
ramps up through different borrowing mechanisms and z
dramatically reduces when the system attains more and more
wealth through successful trades. Fig. 3 presents the CDFs
of budget at MFE across the three models, which indicates
agents are wealthier in the loan model than in the bank model
at MFE (as the bank extracts some of the surplus), while the
budget distribution is similar to the initial values in the hard
constraint model. Fig. 4 shows the binary bid distributions
of clients at MFE, which verifies the results in Section III.
We further evaluate two important statistics, namely the trade
TABLE I
TRADE RATIO AND EXPECTED VALUE
Initial Budget Ψ(Binit) = U [0, 5] Ψ(Binit) = U [5, 10]
Model Hard Bank Loan Hard Bank Loan
Trade Ratio 0% 84.3% 85.2% 97.7% 99.4% 99.5%
Value -12.49 40.14 41.74 48.53 49.6 49.7
ratio and the expected value in Table I, where the expected
value is calculated according to EΨ(Binit)[v∗z(MFE)]. As we
mentioned earlier, the higher trade ratio the market system
achieves, the higher resource utilization it ends up with. Given
the unified bid of server and binary bids of client, the expected
trade ratio is captured by 1− z at MFE. The empirical trade
ratio among the one million agents matches this quantity in all
cases. Intuitively, a higher trade ratio implies a higher expected
value, which is verified in Table I. For the sake of comparison,
we also append the results of sufficient initial budget case,
i.e. Ψ(Binit) = U [5, 10], in Table I as well. We observe
that with a sufficient initial budget, the hard constraint model
also achieves a reasonably high trade ratio at MFE, and the
statistics of bank model catches up with the loan model and
reaches 100% trade ratio.
In the simulations above, we set the unified price k = 7 and
the initial budget, Binit, to be uniform distributed in [0, 5].
Next, we will show how these two attributes affect the trade
ratio of the market system. Fig. 5, 6 and 7 illustrate the trade
ratio and the corresponding expected value versus different
unified prices with different initial budget distributions under
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the bank model. Recall that s = 8 and cserve = 6, which
means that the reasonable range of k lies in [6, 8 + ], given
the client is allowed to overdraw his budget to some extent.
We observe that for Binit in [0, 5], the trade ratio increases
in k; for Binit in [3, 8], the trade ratio first increases then
decreases; for Binit in [5, 10], the trade ratio decreases in k.
An intuitive explanation of these results is as follows. When
most agents have a sufficient budget, lower price yields higher
trade ratio. However, when most agents have a limited budget,
it is better to set higher prices to aggregate the wealth at fewer
agents, which then can obtain service without needing bank
assistance (which reduces the total wealth of the system).
VI. CASE STUDY: PHOTOVOLTAIC MARKET
In this section, we consider a PV energy sharing market
discussed in Section I, in which the agents could be house-
holders or small business owners. During the hours with high
sunshine, the system can supply the electricity consumption
of a single agent. Moreover, it even generates extra energy
that can be fed back to the grid. However, in rainy or overcast
weather, solar panels can only produce 10%-25% of their rated
capacity [13]. This creates the opportunity to share the extra
solar energy between locations with good and bad weather.
In this case study, we pick two big cities in Texas—Austin
and El Paso—as an example. Note that we choose the two
locations far apart from each other to reduce the weather
correlations. Also, it is easier to share electricity energy over
the existing grid facilities for locations in the same state.
Collecting the hourly historical weather data of the two cities
in 2016 from [14], we found that approximately 44% of the
time, both cities have good weather and about 11% of the time
both have bad weather (hence do not need the market).
We are interested in situations in which the two cities have
different weather so that they could share extra solar energy
between each other. It turns out that the probabilities these
events are 0.28(Austin-bad, El Paso-good) and 0.17 (Austin-
good, El Paso-bad). Normalizing these values, we obtain two
type of agents: Austin agents that are clients about 60% of
the time and are servers 40% of the time, and El Paso agents
who are exactly the opposite. Given the heterogeneous types
of agents, we have a slightly different set up than in the cloud
computing case, in which all agents were homogeneous. Also,
given the regional weather effects, all Austin agents are of one
type, while all El Paso agents are of one type. We will show
the convergence of the coupling beliefs and the consistency
of budget distributions across agent types under the chosen
market price, k. The setting resembles the one in [15], with
multiple agent types that undergo exogenous changes.
We choose parameters for our anlysis based on readily
available data. As we discussed above, ps and pc for Austin
(El Paso) agents are 40%(60%) and 60%(40%) respectively.
The average solar system size in the U.S. is 5kw [16]. Given
that the average electricity usage is roughly 2.5kwh per hour
in daytime [17], a server is able to provide 2.5kwh extra
energy with one hour full sunshine, which is sufficient to
supply a typical client. Given the average electricity price
to be 10 cents/kwh, we set the value of surplus s = 10.
However, an accurate unit cost for rooftop solar energy is
not well established, since it varies by the installation fee,
the maintenance fee, the government subsidy, etc., and we
use 5 cents/kwh as a conservative estimate [18], which yields
cserve = 5. For simplicity of simulation, we take the currency
unit in our simulation as 2.5 cents (so that one unit of service
is traded), and multiply back by this amount after completion.
We choose the unified price k = 7.5 to balance the benefits
of the trade between clients and servers. A sufficient budget
initialization Ψ(Binit) = U [5, 10] is used.
Fig. 8 shows the convergence of the coupled beliefs. We see
that El Paso clients get involved in trades faster than Austin
clients, since the higher probability of being servers makes
them get wealthy faster. Also, the higher probability of being
a client for Austin agents makes their value of budget lower,
which is shown in Fig. 9. Fig. 10 illustrates the consistency
of budget distributions between the two agent types. With the
balanced price chosen, the consistency of budget distributions
implies a high trade ratio. Indeed, the trade ratio turns out
to be 99.9%, which matches our discussion of the sufficient
budget case in Section V as well.
Finally, we evaluate our market system using weather traces
in the year 2016. We conservatively define daytime to be the
interval between one hour after sunrise to one hour before
sunset, and found that in 1115 time periods (hours) an Austin
agent is a client whereas in 692 time periods, an El Paso
agent is a client. We now calculate the savings for the agents
participating in our proposed market and compare it with the
case that one uses Net Metering. One potentially saves (1115∗
(10−7.5)+692∗(7.5−5))∗2.5/100∗99.9% ≈ $112.8/year
through our market. Note that the price k balances the benefits
of the trade, so the savings are consistent between different
types of agents. However, as a Net Meter user, the grid usually
pays at the rate 5¢/kwh [19], which gives zero profit as a server
and encounters deficits as a client, i.e. −1115 ∗ 10/100 =
−$111.5/year for an Austin agent and −692 ∗ 10/100 =
−$69.2/year for an El Paso agent.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of market equilib-
ria that arise in sharing economies where agents change roles
frequently from provider (server) to consumer (client). We
developed a model of bilateral trade under which consumers
and providers are matched randomly with each other. Under
the MFG setting, we showed that the MFE consists of a single
price bid by both client and server. We conducted numerical
evaluations to study the effects of different equilibrium prices
on trade ratios, and showed in a case study that significant
savings are possible in a rooftop PV setting.
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APPENDIX
A. Proofs in Section III
Proof of Lemma 1 Recall the definition of A(b) : D×D∩
[0, b+s/(1+α)]. We claim the effective bid of a server, xs, lies
in a compact set with an upper bound x¯s, which follows from
the argument that no server will bid above x¯s <∞ such that
the expected return is below cserve (since this has to be paid
in every time-frame). By (2), when a server bids xs we have
only the clients with budget b ≥ xs − s/(1 + α) will respond
so that the expected return is given by xsρc(xs − s/(1 +α)).
However, all budget distributions in our system are stochas-
tically dominated by the distribution obtained by transferring
all wealth s− cserve to both the client or server in every time
period. Note that the initial budget is given by the regeneration
distribution that has support Binit. We will assume that Binit
is bounded with upper-bound b¯init. Given the lifetime of an
agent in the system is geometrically distributed with parameter
1− β, we have
ρc
(
xs − s
1 + α
)
≤ βxs−s/(1+α)−b¯init .
Thus, we have the expected return of the server
xsρc(xs − s/(1 + α)) ≤ xsβxs−s/(1+α)−b¯init , and
lim
xs→∞
xsρc(xs − s/(1 + α)) ≤ lim
xs→∞
xsβ
xs−s/(1+α)−b¯init
= 0.
Define the following
R , max
xs≥0
xsβ
xs−s/(1+α)b¯init .
We will assume that the parameters (β, s, α) are chosen such
that R ≥ cserve. Under this assumption we set x¯s to be the
largest root of the transcendental equation
cserve = xβ
x−s/(1+α)−b¯init .
Meanwhile, as a client, given a finite budget b, the closed
interval [0, b+s/(1+α)] is compact. Hence the effective action
space lies in a compact set Aˆ(b) , D ∩ [0, x¯s]×D ∩ [0, x¯c],
where x¯c , b+ s/(1 + α).
We define the reward per stage as
c(b, (xs, xc))
, ps(1− ρc(xs))(xs − cserve)
+ pc
(
ρs(xc)(s− E[X˜s|X˜s ≤ xc])− (1− ρs(xc))close
)
.
Since cserve, s and close are constants, we have c(b, (xs, xc))
is bounded and continuous in (xs, xc). Finally, the third result
follows from the continuity of the transition kernel Q over
discrete topology of Aˆ(b).
Proof of Lemma 4 Suppose fn is monotonically increasing
and x∗s, x
∗
c maximize Tρfn(b) = fn+1(b). Let b
′ > b we have
fn+1(b
′)
≥ ps
(
Eρ[1x˜c≥x∗s (βfn(b
′ + xs − cserve) + xs − cserve)
+ 1x˜c<x∗sβf(b
′)]
)
+ pc
(
Eρ[1x∗c≥x˜s(βfn(b
′ + s− x˜s
− α(x˜s − b′)+) + s− x˜s) + 1x∗c<x˜s(βfn(b′)− close)]
)
≥ ps
(
Eρ[1x˜c≥x∗s (βfn(b+ xs − cserve) + xs − cserve)
+ 1x˜c<x∗sβf(b)]
)
+ pc
(
Eρ[1x∗c≥x˜s(βfn(b+ s− x˜s
− α(x˜s − b)+) + s− x˜s) + 1x∗c<x˜s(βfn(b)− close)]
)
= fn+1(b)
Proof of Lemma 5 Denote the expected trade ratio vari-
able as κ. Consider the case in which servers bid multiple
values, w.l.o.g., we assume pX˜s = (pX˜s(k1), pX˜s(k2)), where
cserve < k1 < k2 < s and all clients can afford k2. By
the four facts, we have the client will bid either k1 or k2.
We denote the probabilities of clients placing such bids as
pX˜c = (pX˜c(k1), pX˜c(k2)). This gives us
κ =pX˜c(k1)pX˜s(k1) + pX˜c(k2)(pX˜s(k1) + pX˜s(k2))
=pX˜c(k1)pX˜s(k1) + pX˜c(k2)
Now if the servers decide to change unilaterally to p′
X˜s
=
(p′
X˜s
(k′)), where k′ ∈ [k1, k2], p′X˜s(k
′) = 1, the clients who
were bidding k2 will follow the new price k′, since it leads
to a higher payoff. Meanwhile, the clients who were bidding
k1 will choose a bid between 0 and k′ by Fact 3. Bidding k′
yields a lower but positive payoff compared with the earlier,
however, bidding 0 yields a zero payoff. Thus, these clients
will bid k′ as well. The new trade ratio is then
κ′ =(pX˜c(k1) + pX˜c(k2))p
′
X˜s
(k′) = pX˜c(k1) + pX˜c(k2) > κ.
The proof above implies within the clients’ financial ability,
merging two server’s bids always increases the trade ratio,
which induces the result of Lemma 5. Note that the proof
also follows in the case that pX˜c , pX˜s are p.d.fs by replacing
the summations with integrals.
Proof of Lemma 6 By Lemma 4, we have v∗ρ is mono-
tonically increasing in b, which induces the monotonicity of
vc win and vc lose. Therefore, vc win and vc lose are bounded
increasing on the closed interval [k − s1+α , k − s−kα ]. Define
g(b) , vc win(b) − vc lose(b) for b ∈ [k − s1+α , k − s−kα ].
We have g(b) is of bounded variation, i.e. g(b) has finite total
variation on [k − s1+α , k − s−kα ]. Thus, the number of zero
crossings of g(b) over the closed interval is finite. Therefore,
θc,ρ(b) is piecewise constant on [0, k − s−kα ] with a finite
number of constant intervals. Within each of the intervals,
θc,ρ(b) is constant and either 0 or k. At the boundaries
of these intervals, where vc win(b) = vc lose(b), we have
θc,ρ(b) = {0, k}.
B. Proofs in Section IV
Proof of Lemma 7 From (6), for Borel set B, we have
P(b[t + 1] ∈ B|b[t] = b) ≥ (1 − β)Ψ(B) > 0, which
satisfies the Doeblin condition. Then the budget chain is
ergodic. The rest of the first part proof follows the results in
Chapter 12, Meyn and Tweedie [12]. Since the regeneration
happens independently of the budget transition between two
regenerations, we could further derive the relationship between
piz(B) and pi
(τ)
z (B|b), where τ is the first regeneration time
after t = 0 and b(0) = b so that pi(τ)z (·|·) is the τ -step transition
function without any regenerations.
piz(B) =
∞∑
τ=0
(1− β)βτ
∫
pi(τ)z (B|b)dΨ(b)
=
∞∑
τ=0
(1− β)βτEΨ
(
pi(τ)z (B|Binit)
)
,
where we use the short-hand EΨ
(
pi
(τ)
z (B|Binit)
)
to mean∫
pi
(τ)
z (B|b)dΨ(b).
Since piz(·) is the invariant budget distribution through the
transition kernel defined in (6), pi(τ)z (B|b) is basically the τ
-step transitions starting at b0 = b without regenerations. If B
is a Lebesgue null-set, we have Ψ(B) = 0 and in each of the
τ step pi(τ)z (B|b) = 0, therefore, piz(B) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 8 For any given z, by Theorem 1 there is a
unique v∗z(·) which is the unique fixed point of the contraction
mapping T jz with Lipschitz constant λ ∈ (0, 1). Rewriting (4)
in terms of z and k, we have
(T jz f)(b)
= βf(b) + ps(1− z)(k − cserve + β∆fs(b, k, cserve))+
max
xc∈Ak(b)
(
pcxc
s− k + close + β∆fc(b, s, k, α)
k
, 0
)
− pcclose
where
Ak(b) = [0, b+ s/(1 + α)] ∩ {0, k},
∆fs(b, k, cserve) = f(b+ k − cserve)− f(b), and
∆fc(b, s, k, α) = f(b+ s− k − α(k − b)+)− f(b).
Taking the derivative with respect to z using the Envelope
Theorem, we have T jz is Lipschitz continuous in z with
constant k − cserve.
Pick z1 and z2, we have
||T jz1v
∗
z2
−T jz2v
∗
z2
||∞
|z1−z2| ≤ k − cserve.
Since v∗z2 is the unique fixed point of the contraction mapping
T jz2 , we have T
j
z2v
∗
z2 = v
∗
z2 . Then we have
||T jz1v
∗
z2
−v∗z2 ||∞
|z1−z2| ≤
k − cserve. Applying T jz1 n times, given the contraction
parameter λ, we have
||T (n+1)jz1 v
∗
z2
−Tnjz1 v
∗
z2
||∞
|z1−z2| ≤ λn(k−cserve).
Also, we have the unique fixed point of T jz1 being v
∗
z1 . Letting
n→∞, completes the proof as follows:
||v∗z1 − v∗z2 ||∞
|z1 − z2| ≤
∞∑
n=0
||T (n+1)jz1 v∗z2 − Tnjz1 v∗z2 ||∞
|z1 − z2|
≤ k − cserve
1− λ
Proof of Theorem 3 Given z and k, the optimal value
function can be rewritten as
v∗z(b)
= βv∗z(b) + ps(1− z)(k − cserve + β∆vs(b, k, cserve))+
max
xc∈Ak(b)
(
pc
(
1xc=k(s− k + β∆vc(b, s, k, α))− 1xc=0close
))
= βv∗z(b) + ps(1− z)(k − cserve + β∆vs(b, k, cserve))+
max
xc∈Ak(b)
(
pcxc
s− k + close + β∆vc(b, s, k, α)
k
, 0
)
− pcclose
where
Ak(b) = [0, b+ s/(1 + α)] ∩ {0, k},
∆vs(b, k, cserve) = v
∗
z(b+ k − cserve)− v∗z(b), and
∆vc(b, s, k, α) = v
∗
z(b+ s− k − α(k − b)+)− v∗z(b).
Define the increasing piecewise linear convex function
hz(y):R 7→ R given by
hz(y) =φ(z) + max
xc∈Ak(b)
(
xcy)+,
where (·)+ := max(·, 0) and
φ(z) := βv∗z(b) + ps(1− z)
(
k − cserve
+ β∆vs(b, k, cserve)
)
− pcclose.
By Lemma 8, we have v∗z(·) is continuous in z for all
xc ∈ Ak(b). Thus we have φ(z) is continuous in z for all
xc ∈ Ak(b). By Berge’s Maximum Theorem we have the
correspondence,
F(y) := arg max
xc∈Ak(b)
(xcy)+
is upper hemicontinuous in z. Note that θc,z(b) is given by
θc,z(b) = F
(
pc
s− k + close + β∆vc(b, s, k, α)
k
)
. (7)
Given the Lipschitz continuity of v∗z(·) in z, we conclude for
every state b, θc,z(b) is upper hemicontinuous in z.
Proof of Theorem 4 By Lemma 7, given z, we have
the Markov process of the budgets has a unique stationary
distribution piz . Here, we will prove the continuity of piz in z.
By the Portmanteau Theorem, we only need to show that for
any uniform converging sequence zn → z and any open set
B, lim infn→∞ pizn(B) ≥ piz(B). Thus, by Fatou’s Lemma,
we have
lim inf
n→∞ pizn(B) = lim infn→∞
∞∑
τ=0
(1− β)βτEΨ
(
pi(τ)zn (B|Binit)
)
≥
∞∑
τ=0
(1− β)βτEΨ
(
lim inf
n→∞ pi
(τ)
zn (B|Binit)
)
To complete the proof, we need to show that
lim inf
n→∞ pi
(τ)
zn (B|b) ≥ pi(τ)z (B|b). for every b ∈ Binit
The proof of the above holds by mathematical induction and
the Skorokhod representation theorem. Details of a similar
proof can be found in the appendix of [20].
Proof of Theorem 5 Define the single-point inverse (lower
inverse) θ−1c,z (0) = {b ≥ 0 : 0 ∈ θc,z(b)} and also the upper
inverse θ˜−1c,z (0) = {b ≥ 0 : θc,z(b) = {0}}. By Lemma
6, we have θ−1c,z (0) consists of a finite number of closed
subintervals in [0, k − s−kα ], and θ˜−1c,z (0) a finite number of
open intervals (in R+) the closure of which is exactly θ−1c,z (0),
with the difference being only finitely many points. Since piz
is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure we
have
piz
(
θ−1c,z (0)
)
= piz
(
θ˜−1c,z (0)
)
,
so that θ−1c,z (0) is a continuity set of piz for every z.
From the definition of θc,z(·) we have
θ−1c,z (0)
=
{
b : h(b) ≥ 0, v∗z(h(b))− v∗z(b) ≤
k − s− close
β
}
∪ {b : h(b) ≤ 0}
θ˜−1c,z (0)
=
{
b : h(b) ≥ 0, v∗z(h(b))− v∗z(b) <
k − s− close
β
}
∪ {b : h(b) ≤ 0},
where we have
h(b) = b+ s− k − α(k − b)+
and {b : h(b) ≤ 0} =
[
0, k − s
1 + α
]
We know that v∗z(·) is Lipschitz continuous in z so that for
all  > 0 we have
‖vz′ − vz‖∞ ≤ L ∀z′ ∈ [z − , z + ] ∩ [0, 1]
‖vz′ − vz‖∞ < L ∀z′ ∈ (z − , z + ) ∩ [0, 1].
This then implies that for all {b ≥ k − s1+α : h(b) ≥ 0} we
have
v∗z(h(b))− v∗z(b)− 2L ≤ v∗z′(h(b))− v∗z′(b)
≤ v∗z(h(b))− v∗z(b) + 2L ∀z′ ∈ [z − , z + ] ∩ [0, 1]
v∗z(h(b))− v∗z(b)− 2L < v∗z′(h(b))− v∗z′(b)
< v∗z(h(b))− v∗z(b) + 2L ∀z′ ∈ (z − , z + ) ∩ [0, 1]
Therefore we have
θ−1c,z′(0) ⊆ Fz(), Oz() ⊆ θ˜−1c,z′(0),
where the closed set Fz() and the open set Oz() are given
by
Fz()
=
{
b : h(b) ≥ 0, v∗z(h(b))− v∗z(b) ≤
k − s− close
β
+ 2L
}
∪ {b : h(b) ≤ 0},
Oz()
=
{
b : h(b) ≥ 0, v∗z(h(b))− v∗z(b) <
k − s− close
β
− 2L
}
∪ {b : h(b) ≤ 0}.
Given a sequence {zn}n≥1 such that limn→∞ zn = z, we
know that pizn ⇒ piz . Next fix an  > 0. Then by the
Portmanteau theorem we have
piz(Oz()) ≤ lim inf
n→∞ pizn(Oz())
≤ lim inf
n→∞ pizn(θ˜
−1
c,zn(0)) = lim infn→∞ pizn(θ
−1
c,zn(0))
≤ lim sup
n→∞
pizn(θ˜
−1
c,zn(0)) = lim sup
n→∞
pizn(θ
−1
c,zn(0))
≤ lim sup
n→∞
pizn(Fz())
≤ piz(Fz()).
Now the proof that limn→∞ pizn(θ
−1
c,zn(0)) = piz(θ
−1
c,z (0))
follows by noticing that for 1 < 2 we have
Oz(2) ⊆ Oz(1), Fz(1) ⊆ Fz(2),
so lim
↓0
Oz() = θ˜
−1
c,z (0), lim
↓0
Fz() = θ
−1
c,z (0),
and also the fact that piz(θ˜−1c,z (0)) = piz(θ
−1
c,z (0)).
